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SELF-DEFENSE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
A number of affirmative defenses sanction the use of 
force. Self defense is the most common and the most im-
portant of these defenses. Related defenses include de-
fense of others, defense of a dwelling, and defense of prop-
erty. Generally, these defenses are controlled by the com-
·> mon law. Burdens of proof, however, are specified by 
·~ statute. In addition, the legislature has enacted a provision 
on the admissibility of evidence of the battered woman syn-
··; drome in self-defense cases. 
-' 
ElEMENTS OF SElF-DEFENSE 
A claim of self-defense is typically raised in crimes 
against the person - murder, manslaughter, attempted 
murder, aggravated assault, and assault. See also United 
States v: Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982) (defense of 
.· , self-protection valid where convicted felon who reasonably 
tl ,eared for his safety took possession of a firearm and was 
charged with a statute making it a crime for a convicted 
felon to possess a firearm). 
The basis of self-defense is the perceived necessity of 
the use of force to protect oneself. An 1876 Ohio case ob-
serves that "the taking of life in defense of one's person can-
not be either justified or excused, except on the ground of 
necessity; and that such necessity must be imminent at the 
time; and ... no man can avail himself of such necessity if 
he brings it upon himself." Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 
199 (1876). 
The genesis of the law of self-defense in Ohio can be 
traced back to the 19th Century. In Marts v. State, 26 Ohio 
St. 162, 167-68 (1875), the Ohio Supreme Court estab-
lished the requirements for self-defense: 
Homicide is justifiable on the ground of self-defense, 
where the slayer, in the careful and proper use of his 
faculties, bona fide believes, and has reasonable 
ground to believe, that he is in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm, and that his only means of 
escape from such danger will be by taking the life of 
his assailant, although in fact he is mistaken as to the 
existence or imminence of the danger. The fact of the 
existence of such danger is not an indispensable re-
quirement. 
Over 1 00 years later, in State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 
20-21, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978), the Court again set forth the 
elements of self-defense: 
To establish self-defense, the following elements must 
be shown: (1) the slayer was not at fault in creating the 
situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the slayer has a 
bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm and that his only means of 
escape from such danger was in the use of such force; 
and (3) the slayer must not have violated any duty to 
retreat or avoid the danger. 
The Court has consistently adhered to the Melchior state-
ment of the elements of self-defense in later cases. E.g., 
State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247,249, 551 N.E.2d 1279 
(1990); State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 283, 490 
N.E.2d 893 (1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987); State 
v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979). 
The elements of self-defense specified in Melchior, how-
ever, differ from the elements in Marts in some important re-
spects. The second element of the Me/choir definition does 
not require that the defendant's belief be "reasonable," as 
does Marts. Similarly, Marts fails to specify a duty to retreat, 
which is the third element of Me/choir. These differences 
are discussed below. 
NONDEADlY FORCE 
A person who is without fault may defend himself with the 
use of nondeadly force. 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive 
Criminal Law§ 5.7(b), at 651 (1986). The degree of force 
depends on what appears reasonably necessary to protect 
that person from the imminent use of unlawful force. 
'Therefore, even when faced with less than impending 
death or great physical harm, one may use reasonable force 
in order to protect oneself." State v. Fox, 36 Ohio App.3d 78, 
80, 520 N.E.2d 1390 (1987). See also City of Akron v. 
Oakes, 31 Ohio App.3d 24, 507 N.E.2d 1158 (1986) ("[O]ne 
may use such force as the circumstances require to protect 
oneself against such danger as one has good reason to ap-
prehend. Thus, even when faced with less than impending 
death or great physical harm, one may use reasonable force 
in order to protect oneself against a perceived danger:'); 
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State v. Morris, 8 Ohio App.3d 12, 19, 455 N.E.2d 1352 
(1982) ("Defense counsel argued self-defense for each of 
the assaults, and the trial judge expressly acquitted defen-
dant of ... the charge relating to the first assaultive involve-
ment on that ground."); State v. Mcleod, 82 Ohio App. 155, 
157, 80 N.E.2d 699 (1948) (assault & battery case) ("In 
general, every man has the right to defend himself and his 
property by the use of such force as circumstances require 
to protect himself against such danger as he has good rea-
son to apprehend."). 
Thus, in a simple assault case, an accused is justified in 
using force "against the imminent use of unlawful force as 
long as it was not likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm." Columbus v. Dawson, 33 Ohio App.3d 141, 142, 514 
N.E.2d 908 (1986). 
DEADLY FORCE 
The use of deadly force, of course, requires greater justifi-
cation. The defendant must reasonably believe that he is in 
danger of death or great bodily injury. In State v. Stewart, 1 
Ohio St. 66, 75 (1852), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the 
view that deadly force could be used to repel any attack, 
even a nonlethal one: "If this is so, a man upon whom an or-
dinary assault and battery is committed may pierce his as-
sailant with a sword, or knock him down with an axe, for each 
of these is a weapon 'sufficient to resist the force employed.' 
We do not think such is the law.'' In short, a person may gen-
eraiiy use deadiy force to repei deadly force. However, dead-
ly force may be justified even when the assailant is unarmed 
-for example, a small woman may be justified in using 
deadly force against an unarmed attacker who is much larg-
er. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(b), at 653 ("[A]ccount must be 
taken of the respective sizes and sex of the assailant and de-
fendant, of the presence of multiple assailants, and the espe-
cially violent nature of the unarmed attack.''). 
The key is the reasonableness of the defender's conduct: 
"[l]t is only when one uses a greater degree of force than is 
necessary under all the circumstances that it is not justifi-
able on the ground of self-defense .... The law does not 
require of the defendant any nice distinction as to the least 
amount of force necessary, but whether the force used was 
excessive is a question for the trier of facts." State v. 
Mcleod, 82 Ohio App. 155, 157, 80 N.E.2d 699 (1948) (as-
sault & battery case). 
REASONABLE BELIEF IN NECESSITY OF FORCE 
The majority rule in this country requires the defendant to 
have an honest and reasonable belief in the existence and 
imminence of the danger. As the United States Supreme 
Court commented, "[f]he question for the jury was whether, 
without fleeing from his adversary, he had, at the moment 
he struck the deceased, reasonable grounds to believe, and 
in good faith believed, that he could not save his life or pro-
tect himself from great bodily harm except by doing what he 
did.'' Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 560 (1895). In 
other words, it is not enough that the belief be held in good 
faith (a subjective belief); the belief also must be reason-
able, which incorporates an objective standard. "[T]he case 
law and statutory law on self-defense generally require that 
the defendant's belief in the necessity of using force to pre-
vent harm to himself be a reasonable one, so that one who 
honestly though unreasonably believes in the necessity of 
using force in self-protection loses the defense." 1 LaFave & 
Scott, § 5.7(c), at 653-54. 
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Subjective test 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, however, dis-
agreed with the majority view; they required only an honest 
(subjective) belief. Model Penal Code § 3.04(1 ). The 
Code's drafters believed that a defendant who had an han- , 
est but mistaken belief (even an unreasonable one) should 
not be held liable for murder, although the defendant-might 
be guilty of a lesser offense, such as manslaughter. 
Compare, for example, the actor who purposely kills in 
order to reap financial reward and the actor who pur-
posely kills while believing in the existence of circum-
stances that would, if they actually existed, exonerate 
on self-defense grounds. If the second actor was mis-
taken - if the circumstances were not in fact as he be-
lieved-them to be - it is unjust to view him as having 
the same level of culpability as the first actor. It is un-
just to put him at thatlevel even if he was negligent [un-
reasonable] or reckless in forming his belief, though to 
be sure in.that case it would be appropriate to view him 
as culpable . . . . If the actor was reckless or negligent 
as to the existence of circumstances that would justify 
his conduct, he should then be subject to conviction 
of a crime for which recklessness or negligence, as 
the case may be, is otherwise sufficient to establish 
culpability. American Law Institute, Model P~nal Code 
and Commentaries 36 (1985). 
Few jurisdictions follow this purely subjective approach, al-
though some othei jurisdictions recognize vJhat is described 
as "imperfect self-defense.'' 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(c), at 
655. Under this concept; an unreasonable but sincere (good 
faith) belief in the necessity of the use of deadly force miti-
gates the crime from murder to manslaughter. 1 LaFave & 
Scott, § 5. 7(i), at 663. 
Ohio Rule. The early Ohio cases followed the objective 
rule. In Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162, 167 (1 875), the 
Ohio Supreme Court held that the defender must have a 
"reasonable ground to believe" that he is in danger. Ohio 
Jury Instruction 41 1 .33 reflects this position. 
Inexplicably, the Ohio Supreme Court has omitted the 
reasonableness requirement in outlining the elements of 
self-defense in recent cases. These cases state the require 
ment as follows: "the slayer had a bona fide belief that he 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.'' 
State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 282, 490 N.E.2d 893 
(1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987). Accord State v. 
Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990); 
State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d 755 
(1979); State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 21,381 N.E.2d 
195 (1978). 
Accordingly, in State v. Thomas, 13 Ohio App.3d 211, 213 
468 N.E.2d 763 (1983), the appellate court wrote that "the 
test is a subjective one, relating to the particular defendant 
seeking to prove the defense." In that case the court re-
versed the murder conviction of a woman because the testi-
mony of her psychologist regarding her paranoid personality 
was erroneously excluded at trial. The court commented: 
[l]t is not difficult to perceive that a paranoid personal-
ity, who viewed everything negatively, might interpret 
the danger presented by an advancing individual dif-
ferently than an ordinary person would interpret such 
danger. To that extent, some of the testimony would 
be an aid to the jury in regard to the determination it 
was required to make regarding this particular defen-
dant's mind. 
Citing Thomas, the Supreme Court in State v. Koss, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 213, 215, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990), wrote: "Thus, Ohio 
has adopted a subjective test in determining whether a par-
ticular defendant properly acted in self defense:· The Court, 
1f" however, went on to say that the trial judge had properly in-
·. tJ structed the jury. That instruction commenced with the 
phrase: "In determining whether the Defendant had reason-
able grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent 
danger:' ld. at 216. The term "reasonable grounds" is the 
key aspect of an objective standard. In addition, Marts 
which adopted the objective approach is often cited approv-
ingly in recent Supreme Court cases, as is State v. 
Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281,283, 142 N.E. 141 (1924). In 
Champion the Court wrote that the defendant "must have 
'reasonable grounds' for such bona fide belief:' 
Recently, the Court once again cited the subjective factor 
but then added the following sentence: "The defendant is 
privileged to use that force which is reasonably necessary 
to repel the attack." State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 
249, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990). 
The confusion on this issue may res_ult from failing to 
recognize a middle ground between a purely subjective 
state of mind and a totally objective (reasonable person) 
standard. The intermediate position would require evalua-
tion of the reasonableness of the belief from the defendant's 
point of view. As one court has written, the test is "not rea-
sonable as to a reasonable man, but reasonable as to the 
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142 (1965). This would appear to be the Supreme Court's 
position in State v. Sheets, 115 Ohio St. 308,310, 152 N.E. 
664 (1926), in which an instruction concerning "any man of 
. , ordinary prudence" was found to be defective. The Sheets 
~ & Court noted: "In the Marts case ... [the] self-defense justifi-
cation is placed on the grounds of the bona fides of defen-
dant's belief, and reasonableness therefor, and whether, 
under the circumstances, he exercised a careful and proper 
use of his own faculties." Thus, a later court interpreting 
Sheets wrote: 
[T]he conduct of any individual is to be measured by 
that individual's equipment mentally and physically. He 
may act in self-defense, not only when a reasonable 
person would so act, but when one with the particular 
qualities that the individual himself has would so do. A 
nervous, timid, easily frightened individual is not mea-
sured by the same standard that a stronger, calmer, 
and braver man might be. Nelson v. State, 42 Ohio 
App. 252, 254, 181 N.E. 448 (1932) (The defendant 
was 60 years of age and quite infirm). 
See also State v. Cope, 78 Ohio App. 429,437, 67 N.E.2d 
912 (1946) (''The true test is whether the particular person 
on trial believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that 
he was in danger:'). 
This intermediate position is perhaps best captured in 
Ohio Jury Instruction 411.33(2): 
In determining whether the defendant had reasonable 
grounds for an honest belief that he was in imminent 
danger, you must put yourselves in the position of this 
defendant, with his characteristics, his knowledge or 
1
• (t lack of knowledge, and under the circumstances and 
conditions that surrounded him at that time. You must 
consider the conduct of [the victim] and determine if 
his acts and words caused the defendant to reason-
ably and honestly believe that he was about to be killed 
or to receive great bodily injury. 
3 
There are, however, limitations on this approach. For ex-
ample, voluntary intoxication is not recognized as a legiti-
mate consideration in this context. "One who because of 
voluntary intoxication thinks that he is in danger of imminent 
attack, though a sober man would not have thought so, 
does not have the reasonable belief which the law requires." 
1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(c), at 654. 
EVIDENCE ISSUES: STATE OF MIND 
Threats 
In raising a self-defense claim, ·~he defendant may intro-
duce proof of the victim's threats against her in order to es-
tablish her belief that she was in danger at the time of the 
killing:' State v. Randle, 69 Ohio App.2d 71, 73, 430 N.E.2d 
951 (1980) ("Inherent within the right to offer evidence of 
threats of violence putting the defendant in fear of her life is 
proof of the reason for the threats to be made:'). 
Communicated character. In addition to threats, evi-
dence of the victim's violent character is relevant to show 
that the accused reasonably believed that he was in danger 
of death or grievous bodily injury: 
. On the trial of an indictment for murder, the prisoner 
may, for the purpose of showing that the homicide was 
justifiable on the ground of self-defense, prove that the 
deceased was a person of violent, vicious, and dan-
gerous character, and that character was known to the 
prisoner at the time of the recontre between them. 
Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875) (syllabus, para. 
1 ). 
Accord McGaw v. State, 123 Ohio St. 196, 201, 174 N.E. 
741 (1931) (approving Marts); State v. Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 
301, 307, 82 N.E. 1082 (1907) ("It is conceded that in cases 
of self-defense it is competent for the defendant to prove the 
violent and dangerous character of the deceased at the time 
of the commission of the crime, if such character was then 
known to him."); Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662, 662 
(1882) (syllabus) ("[l]t is competent for the defense to prove 
that the general reputation of the prosecuting witness was 
that of a violent and dangerous man, and that such general 
reputation was known to the accused at the time of the as-
sault, as tending to support the plea of self-defense:'). 
The law is summarized in State v. Smith, 10 Ohio App.3d 
99, 101 460 N.E.2d 693 (1983): 
The deceased's admission to defendant that he had 
killed a person, her personal knowledge of violent at-
tacks by the deceased upon others, and her knowl-
edge through hearsay that the deceased had commit-
ted an unprovoked act of violence upon another, were 
all evidence relevant to defendant's belief that she was 
in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and 
were admissible to prove her state of mind. 
Evidence concerning the victim's violent character (reputa-
tion, opinion, or specific acts) is admissible if known to the 
accused. See State v. Carlson, 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 73, 508 
N.E.2d 999 (1986) ("A defendant, when arguing self-de-
fense, may testify about specific instances of the victim's 
prior conduct in order to establish the defendant's state of 
mind. These events ... tend to show why the defendant be-
lieved that victim would kill or severely injure him."); 1 
Giannelli & Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.6 (3d ed 1996). 
Character evidence may also be admissible for a different 
purpose- to establish the victim as the first aggressor, a 
subject discussed later in this article. 
MISTAKEN BELIEF 
The necessity perceived by the defender need not be ac-
tual; it is sufficient that the defender demonstrate reason-
able grounds for this perception. 'When his belief is rea-
sonable, however, he may be mistaken in his belief and still 
have the defense:' 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.7(c), at 654. As an 
early Ohio case observed: 
It is not ... necessary that the danger should prove 
real, or in fact exist, for, whether real or apparent, if the 
circumstances are such as to induce a belief, reason-
able and well grounded, that life is in peril, or that griev-
ous bodily harm is impending, the party threatened 
with the danger may act upon appearances and slay 
his assailant. Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 58, 62-
63 (1898). 
See also Marcoguiseppe v. State, 114 Ohio St. 299, 301, 
151 N.E. 182 (1926) (Self-defense is a valid defense "al-
though in fact he is mistaken as to the existence or immi-
nence of the danger."); Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162, 167-
68 (1875) ("Homicide is justifiable on the ground of self de-
fense ... although in fact he is mistaken as to the existence 
or imminence of the danger. The fact of the existence of 
such danger is not an indispensable requirement."). 
This position is often justified by citing Justice Holmes' fa-
mous expression: "Detached reflection cannot be demand-
ed in the presence of an uplifted knife." Brown v. United 
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
ACCIDENTAL KILLING OF A THIRD PARTY 
A person who is exercising the right to self-defense is not 
criminally responsible for the accidental injury to a third 
par-ty. See 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(g). The test for culpabili-
ty is "whether the killing would have been justifiable if the 
accused had killed the person whom he intended to kill, as 
the unintended act derives its character from the intended." 
State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio App.2d 284, 287, 290 N.E.2d 921 
(1972) ("[T]he court erred in refusing to include an instruc-
tion that if the jury found that the accused was acting in self-
defense when he fired the shot that killed James Hargrove, 
he would be entitled to acquittal even though Hargrove was 
not the assailant."). 
IMMINENCE REQUIREMENT 
A claim of self-defense requires an imminent attack. See 
Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875) (syllabus, para. 2) 
("Homicide is justifiable on the ground of self-defense, 
where the slayer ... , in the careful and proper use of his 
faculties, bona fide believes, and has reasonable ground to 
believe, that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodi-
ly harm."); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199 (1876) ("such 
necessity must be imminent at the time"); Stewart v. State, 1 
Ohio St. 66, 73 (1852) ('We find no evidence tending to 
prove that Stewart, when he slew Dotey, was in danger of 
loss of life, or limb, or of great bodily harm, or that he appre-
hended such danger."). 
Unless the threat is imminent, the necessity for resorting 
to force is absent. For example, in State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio 
St.2d 28, 31, 330 N.E.2d 67 4 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1061 (1976), the Court held that a self-defense instruction 
was not required because the record was devoid of any evi-
dence ''that the decedent committed an overt act by which 
appellant could reasonably, and in good faith, believe that 
he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. 
Rather, appellant ... failed to present evidence that he 
4 
feared assault from decedent." 
Generally, the reasonable ground requirement is not sat-
isfied by threats of future harm as distinguished from immi-
nent harm. Also, "[v]ile or abusive language, or verbal 
threats, no matter how provocative, do not justify an assault 
or the use of a deadly weapon." Ohio Jury Instructions § · 
411.33(1). 
Battered Woman Syndrome 
The battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes a pat-
tern of violence inflicted on a woman by her mate. See 
generally 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence ch. 
9 (2d ed. 1993). Dr. Lenore Walker, a leading researcher in 
this field, describes a battered woman as follows: 
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly sub-
jected to any forceful physical or psychological behav-
ior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he 
wants her to do without any concern for her rights. 
Battered women include wives or women in any form 
of intimate relationships with men. Furthermore, in 
order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple 
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any 
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with 
a man once. lf.it occurs a second time, and she re-
mains in the situation, she is defined as a battered 
woman. Walker, The Battered Woman xv (1979). 
The violence associated with this type of relationship is nei-
ther constant nor random. Instead, it follows a pattern. Dr. 
Walker has identified a three stage cycle of violence. The 
first stage is the ''tension building" phase, during which small 
abusive episodes occur. These episodes gradually escalate 
over a period of time. The tension continues to build until thE 
second stage -the "acute battering" phase - erupts. 
During this phase, in Which most injuries occur, the battering 
is out of control. Psychological abuse in the form of threats 
of future harm is also prevalent. The third phase is a calm 
loving period in which the batterer is contrite, seeks forgive-
ness, and promises to refrain from future violence. This 
phase provides a positive reinforcement for the woman to 
continue the relationship in the hope that the violent behavio 
will not recur. The cycle then repeats itself. I d. at 65-70. 
In State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 521-22,423 
N.E.2d 137 (1981 ), the Ohio Supreme Court, one of the firs 
courts to consider the issue, rejected BWS evidence. 
Expert testimony on the "battered wife syndrome" by 
a psychiatric social worker to support defendant's 
claim of self-defense is inadmissible herein because 
(1) it is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of 
whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of 
the shooting; (2) the subject of the expert testimony is 
within the understanding of the jury; (3) the "battered 
wife syndrome" is not sufficiently developed, as a mat-
ter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to war-
rant testimony under the guise of expertise; and (4) its 
prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value. 
Most courts in other jurisdictions that considered the issue 
after Thomas adopted the opposing view. According to om 
court, "[o]nly by understanding these unique pressures that 
force battered women to remain with their mates, despite 
their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe bodily 
harm and the isolation that being a battered woman create! 
can a battered woman's state of mind be accurately and 
fairly understood:' State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 
1984). Another court wrote: 
[T]he theory underlying the battered woman's syn-
r 1/J 
drome has indeed passed beyond the experimental 
stage and gained a substantial enough scientific ac-
ceptance to warrant admissibility. . . . [N]umerous arti-
cles and books have been published about the bat-
tered woman's syndrome; and recent findings of re-
searchers in the field have confirmed its presence and 
thereby indicated that the scientific community accepts 
its underlying premises. People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 
358, 363 (Sup. Ct. 1985). 
In State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 217, 551 N.E.2d 970 
(1990), the Supreme Court reversed Thomas: 'We believe 
that the battered woman syndrome has gained substantial 
scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility:• The Court 
noted that the "admission of expert testimony regarding the 
battered woman syndrome does not establish a new de-
fense or justification. Rather, it is to assist the trier of fact in 
determining whether the defendant acted out of an honest 
belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm and that the use of such force was her only 
means of escape:• 
Adopted in 1990, R.C. Section 2901.06 provides for the 
admission of evidence of the battered woman syndrome. 
Subdivision (B) provides that a self-defense claim may be 
supported by "expert testimony of the 'battered woman syn-
drome' and expert testimony that the person suffered from 
that syndrome as evidence to establish the requisite belief 
of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm:' See 
also R.C. 2945.392 (admissibility of battered vvoman syn-
drome evidence in insanity cases). 
DUTY TO RETREAT 
(i (f A majority of American jurisdictions do not require a de-
, ' fender to retreat, even if he can do so safely, before resort-
ing to the use of deadly force. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(f), at 
659. A strong minority, however, impose such a require-
ment, often stated as the duty to "retreat to the wall:' The 
rationale underlying the retreat requirement was succinctly 
stated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code: 
It rests, of course, upon the view that the protection of 
life has such a high place in a proper scheme of social 
values that the law should not permit conduct that 
places life in jeopardy, when the necessity for doing so 
can be avoided by the sacrifice of the much smaller 
value that inheres in standing up to an aggression. To 
the argument that retreat is cowardly and dishonor-
able, the answer embraced has been that of Beale: "A 
really honorable man, a man of truly refined and ele-
vated feeling, would perhaps always regret the appar-
ent cowardice of a retreat, but he would regret ten 
times more, after the excitement of the contest was 
past, the thought that he had the blood of a fellow-
being on his hands." American Law Institute, Model 
Penal Code and Commentaries 54 (1985). 
The early Ohio cases did not appear to require retreat. In 
Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 99-100 (1876), the Ohio 
Supreme Court wrote: 
Does the law hold a man who is violently and felo-
niously assaulted responsible for having brought such 
r. ( necessity upon himself, on the sole ground that he 
failed to fly from his assailant when he might have 
done so? ... [A] true man, who is without fault, is not 
obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or 
surprise maliciously seeks to take his life or do him 
enormous bodily harm. 
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See also Graham v. State, 98 Ohio St. 77, 79, 120 N.E. 232 
(1918) ("[l]f the defendant did not provoke the assault, but 
while in the lawful pursuit of his business was suddenly and 
violently assaulted with a deadly weapon and placed in dan-
ger of loss of life or great bodily harm, under the current 
modern authority he was not required to retreat."). 
By 1975, however, the retreat rule was cited as an ele-
ment of self defense. In State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 
21, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978), the Court set forth a retreat re-
quirement as an element of self-defense: "the slayer must 
not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger." 
This requirement was repeated in State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio 
St.2d 74, 80,388 N.E.2d 755 (1979) ("[A]ppellant had many 
opportunities to retreat and avoid danger, which he failed to 
do."), and applied in State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St. 3d 281, 
283-84, 490 N.E.2d 893 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 
(1987), where the Court stated: 
[A]ppellant's proposed instruction states in essence 
that as long as a person is in any place where he has 
a right to be, there is no duty to retreat from an attack. 
... [U]nder appellant's instruction any one in a public 
place, or any invitee or licensee, would be in a place 
where he has a right to be and would thus have no 
duty to retreat. This instruction is clearly an overbroad 
and incorrect statement of law on the duty to retreat as 
set forth in Robbins ... which incorporates exceptions 
to the duty to retreat only when one is in his home or 
business. 
See also Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.31{2). 
More recently, in State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 
250, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990), the Court noted that in "most 
circumstances, a person may not kill in self-defense if he 
has available a reasonable means of retreat from the con-
frontation." The Court went on to say, that in '~he instant 
case, there was testimony that the confrontation took place 
inside appellee's house and on appellee's porch. Because 
the jury was not instructed on the Peacock rule [see infra], it 
might have believed that appellee was under a duty to re-
treat from his home. It was therefore error for the court to 
fail to give this instruction:' ld. The Court went on to declare, 
however, that '~here is no duty to retreat from one's home." 
ld. at 250. 
State v. Peacock 
State v. Peacock, 40 Ohio St. 333, 334 (1883), has been 
cited both as requiring a duty to retreat and for recognizing 
an exception to that duty for an attack in the defender's 
home. Peacock, however, does not explicitly impose a duty 
to retreat. Thus, the Court in Williford noted that such a duty 
was "implicit" in Peacock. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d at 250. 
As noted above, however, cases both before and after 
Peacock, explicitly rejected the retreat rule. E.g., Ervin 
(1876); Graham (1918). 
See also State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 283, 490 
N.E.2d 893 (1986) (''The Peacock and Graham cases state, 
respectively, that one has no duty to retreat if he is assault-
ed in his home or business."), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917, 
(1987); State v. Reid, 3 Ohio App.2d 215, 221, 210 N.E.2d 
142 (1965) ("In Ohio it is the law that where one is assault-
ed in his home, or the home itself is attacked, he may use 
such means as are necessary to repel the assailant from 
the house, or to prevent his forcible entry, or material injury 
to his home, even to the taking of life:'). 
Exceptions 
Even in a retreat jurisdiction, however, certain exceptions I 
are recognized. The retreat rule applies only to the use of 
deadly force; a defender may use norideadly force without 
retreating. See Columbus v. Dawson, 33 Ohio App.3d 141, 
142, 514 N.E.2d 908 (1986) ("[U]nder Ohio law, there is no 
requirement that a person retreat, although possible, before 
using non-deadly force."). Further, retreat is required only 
when the defendant can do so in complete safety. 
In addition, the courts have recognized several excep-
tions. First, a defender need not retreat in his home or busi-
ness, except perhaps when he is the first aggressor or the 
victim is a co-occupant. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(f), at 660. 
This rule has been extended to a tent at a camp site. 
"Although this issue has not previously been addressed in 
Ohio, it is the opinion of this court that, for purposes of a duty 
to retreat, a tent and a home are the logical equivalent of 
each other. The campsites that appellant and his family oc-
cupied and paid to use on the weekend in question were 
their homes for that time period." State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio 
App.3d 64, 69, 593 N.E.2d 35 (1990) ("It is well established 
that a person has no duty to retreat if attacked in his home."). 
Second, a police officer in the performance of his duty is 
not required to retreat. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(f), at 661. 
FIRST AGGRESSOR RULE 
Only a defendant who "was not at fault in creating the sit-
uation giving rise to the affray" may resort to the use of 
force. State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 20, 381 N.E.2d 
195 (1 978). Accoid State v. ~Jiorgan, 100 Ohio St. 66, 71, 
125 N.E. 109 (1919) ("In respect to the defendant's claim of 
self-defense, it is observed that he was wholly at fault."); 
State v. Stewart, 1 Ohio St. 66, 7 4 (1852) ("Now it does 
seem clear to us that Stewart sought to bring on the affray, 
that he desired to be assaulted, and intended, if assaulted, 
to make ~food his previous threats of using his knife."). 
The "not-at-fault'' requirement means that the defendant 
must not have been the first aggressor in the incident. See 
State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d 755 
(1979) ("[A]ppellant admitted striking the first blow and 
being the aggressor."); State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 
21, 381 N. E.2d 195 (1978) ("Defendant was clearly the ag-
gressor:'); State v. Doty, 94 Ohio St. 258, 268, 113 N.E. 811 
(1916) ("It is difficult to see how the question of self-defense 
arises in this case, since the testimony disclosed that the 
defendant was the aggressor."); Stoffer v. Scoffer, 15 Ohio 
St. 47, 51 (1864) ("[W]hile the party who first commences a 
malicious assault continues in the combat, ... although he 
may be so fiercely pressed that he can not retreat or is 
thrown upon the ground, or driven to the wall, he can not 
justify taking the life of his adversary, however necessary it 
may be to save his own; and must be deemed to have 
brought it upon himself the necessity of killing his fellow 
man:'). 
Evidence 
The Ohio Rules of Evidence permit a defendant to intro-
duce evidence of the deceased's character to establish that 
the deceased was the first aggressor. See 1 Giannelli & 
Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.6 (3d ed 1995). Evidence 
Rule 404(A) generally precludes the admission of character 
evidence to prove conduct on a particular occasion. The 
Rule, however, recognizes several exceptions. For example, 
Rule 404(A)(2) reads: 
Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an ac-
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evi-
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dence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim 
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor is ad-
missible .... 
This provision must be read in conjunction with Evidence 
Rule 405(A), which governs the permissible methods of 
proving character; only reputation and opinion evidence is 
permitted to prove character. 
As noted earlier, evidence of the victim's violent characte1 
may also be relevant to show that the accused acted rea-
sonably, an element of self-defense that is different from the 
first aggressor issue; The "reasonable belief" issue, howev-
er, does not involve the circumstantial use of character to 
prove the conduct of the victim, but rather involves the use 
of charaCter to prove the defendant's state of mind, and thu:: 
is not controlled by Rules 404 and 405. Thus, the defendan 
is not limited to reputation and opinion evidence when es-
tablishing his state of mind. 
If character evidence is introduced to show its effect on 
the accused's state of mind, its relevance obviously de-
pends on whether the accused was familiar with the vic-
tim's character. In contrast, if character evidence is intro-
duced to show that the victim acted in conformity with his vi· 
olent character and was therefore the first aggressor, it is ir-
relevant whether the accused was aware of the victim's 
character. In State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio App.3d 64, 70, 593 
N.E.2d 35 (1990), the court wrote: 
!t is clear that a defendant may not introduce evidence 
of a victim's prior specific instances of conduct to show 
the defendant's state of mind unless the defendant had 
knowledge of that conduct. If the defendant was not 
aware of the victim's prior conduct, that conduct is ir-
relevant as it could not have affected the defendant's 
state of mind at the time of the incident. ... 
However, in the case sub judice, appellant attempted 
to introduce evidence of the victim's propensity for vio-
lence to show who was the aggressor. 
See also State v. Debo, 8 Ohio App.2d 325, 328, 222 
N.E.2d 656 (1966) ("The evidence of communicated threats 
did not preclude the admissibility of uncommunicated 
threats to show animus of the deceased toward accused, 
the probability of his aggression; and made it admissible to 
corroborate the communicated threats."); State v. Schmidt, 
65 Ohio App.2d 239, 243, 417 N.E.2d 1264 (1979) ('Where 
competent evidence of character is offered for the purpose 
of showing that the deceased victim was the aggressor, 
such evidence is admissible, regardless of the extent of the 
accused's knowledge of such character or of the particular 
evidence in question."). 
Wigmore stated it this way: "[The] additional element of 
communication is unnecessary, for the question is what the 
deceased probably did, not what the accused probably 
thought the deceased was going to do. The inquiry is one of 
objective occurrence, not of subjective belief." 1 A Wigmore, 
Evidence § 63, at 1369 (Tillers rev. 1983). 
REVIVAL OF RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE 
There are some circumstances under which a first ag-
gressor's right of self-defense is restored. 
Withdrawal 
First, an aggressor who effectively withdraws from the 
encounter may defend himself if subsequently attacked. In 
State v. Reid, 3 Ohio App.2d 215, 220, 210 N.E.2d 142 
(1965), the court stated: 
While one who first makes a malicious assault upon 
another continues in the conflict which ensues, he can 
not justify taking the life of his adversary, however nec-
essary it may be to save his own, or to whatever ex-
tremity he may be reduced. But when he has suc-
ceeded in wholly withdrawing from the conflict, and in 
good faith, has retreated to a place of apparent securi-
ty, his right of self-defense is fully restored. 
Similarly, in State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 21 , 381 
N.E.2d 195 (1978), the Supreme Court acknowledged this 
"well-recognized" exception and quoted from Wharton's 
Criminal Law text: 
"Even though the accused may in the first jnstance 
have intentionally brought on the difficulty and pro-
voked the occasion, yet his right of self-defense will re-
vive and his actions will be held justifiable upon the 
ground of self-defense in all cases where he has with-
drawn from the affray or difficulty in good faith as far 
as he possibly can, and clearly and fairly announced 
his desire for peace:' 
See also Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, 53 (1864) ("But 
when he has succeeded in wholly withdrawing himself from 
the contest ... he is again remitted to his right of self-de-
fense, and may make it effectual by opposing force to 
force:'); State v. Davis, 8 Ohio App.3d 205, 208, 456 N.E.2d 
1256 (1 982) ("The trial judge did not say self-defense is 
never available to an aggressor. The court's instruction 
clearly explained that an aggressor's action may be justified 
as· self-defense if he previously withdrew from the confronta-
tion in good faith."). 
Escalation to deadly force 
Some jurisdictions recognize a second circumstance 
where self-defense is revived for a first aggressor: "A non-
deadly aggressor (i.e., one who begins an encounter, using 
only his fist or some nondeadly weapon) who is met with 
deadly force in defense may justifiably defend himself 
against the deadly attack. This is because the aggressor's 
victim, by using deadly force against nondeadly aggression, 
uses unlawful force." 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.7, at 658. 
Whether Ohio follows this approach is unclear. 
BURDEN OF PRODUCTION 
The term "burden of proof' encompasses both the burden 
of production (i.e., the burden of coming forward with evi-
dence), and the burden of persuasion (i.e., the burden of 
convincing the trier of fact of the truth of the assertion by the 
quantum of evidence that the law demands). State v. 
Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 107,351 N.E.2d 88 (1976). 
The burden of production for an affirmative defense is on 
the defendant. R.C. 2901.05(A). Indeed, the very concept 
of an affirmative defense implies that the burden of produc-
tion is on the defendant and that such a defense will not be 
an issue at trial unless sufficient evidence on the issue is 
admitted at trial.· Of course, this evidence may be intro-
duced through the prosecution's case-in-chief. Graham v. 
State, 98 Ohio St. 77,81-82,120 N.E. 232 (1918) ("The evi-
dence of self-defense may come wholly from the state; but 
whether the evidence comes from the defense, or from the 
state supporting his lawful right of self defense, it is the duty 
j of the court to charge that feature of the law."). 
R.C. Section 2901.05(C) defines an affirmative defense 
as one that is either (1) "expressly designated" as an affir-
mative defense, or (2) involves "an excuse or justification 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, on which he 
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can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence:· Self-
defense is an affirmative defense, not by statutory definition, 
but rather because the justification is peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the defendant. See State v. Williford, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 247, 249, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990) ("Under Ohio law, 
self-defense is an affirmative defense."); State v. Martin, 21 
Ohio St. 3d 91, 93-94, 488 N.E.2d 166 (1986) ("This court 
has long determined that self-defense is an affirmative de-
fense .... [and] is one peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
defendant, which he, not the state, may fairly be required to 
prove."), aff'd, 480 U.S. 228 (1 987); State v. Seliskar, 35 
Ohio St.2d 95, 96, 298 N.E.2d 582 (1 973) ("[T]he elements 
of self-defense can best be established by testimony of a 
defendant as none is in better position than defendant to 
provide evidence to aid the jury in determining whether de-
fendant's acts were justified."). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
If a defendant fails to meet the burden of production, the 
jury should not be instructed on self-defense. For example, 
in State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St.2d 28, 31, 330 N.E.2d 674 
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976), the Supreme 
Court rejected the defendant's claim that an instruction was 
required because "the record [was] devoid of evidence that 
[defendant], out of concern for his safety, intended to shoot 
the decedent ... or that the decedent committed an overt 
act by which [defendant] could reasonably, and in good 
faith, believe that he was in imminent danger of death or 
great bodiiy harm." 
The test for determining when a jury instruction is re-
quired is "whether the defendant introduced sufficient evi-
dence, which, if believed, would raise a question in the 
minds of reasonable men concerning the existence of such 
issues." State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d 
755 (1 979) (quoting State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 20, 
381 N.E.2d 195 (1 978) (syllabus, para. 1) ("If the evidence 
generates only a mere speculation or possible doubt, such 
evidence is insufficient to the affirmative defense, and sub-
mission of the issue to the jury will be unwarranted."). 
The Court has "repeatedly held that a failure to object be-
fore the jury retires in accordance with the second para-
graph of Grim. R. 30(A), absent plain error, constitutes a 
waiver." Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d at 251. 
Once an objection is made, however, the defense is not 
required to proffer an instruction of the issue; an accused 
has a right to expect that the trial court will give complete 
jury instructions on all issues raised by the evidence. "[W]e 
hold that, where the trial court fails to give a complete or 
correct jury instruction on the elements of the offense 
charged and the defenses thereto which are raised by the 
evidence, the error is preserved for appeal when the defen-
dant objects in accordance with the second paragraph of 
Grim. R. 30(A), whether or not there has been a proffer of 
written jury instructions in accordance with the first para-
graph of Grim. R. 30(A)." Williford, 49 Ohio St. 3d at 252. 
"Additionally, it is not realistic to expect counsel to anticipate 
errors of omission or misstatements of the law in the trial 
court's instructions and proffer written instructions in order 
to preserve possible errors for appeal." ld. 
The jury should never be instructed on the burden of pro-
duction, which is a decision for the judge alone. The jury 
need only be instructed on the burden of persuasion. 
BURDEN OF PERSUASION 
In Ohio, the burden of persuasion for self-defense falls 
upon the accused, and the standard of proof is a preponder-
ance of evidence. At one time, however, the allocation of the 
burden of persuasion was controversial. Prior to 197 4 the 
common law placed the burden of persuasion with respect to 
self-defense on the defendant. The standard of proof was a 
preponderance of the evidence. E.g., State v. Robinson, 47 
Ohio St.2d 103, 109-11 0, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976) ("Ohio com-
mon law has consistently followed the traditional rule that 
self-defense must be proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence:'); State v. Seliskar, 35 Ohio St.2d 95, 96, 298 N.E.2d 
582 (1973); State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19, 294 N.E.2d 
888 (1973) ("Affirmative defenses [such as self-defense] 
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence:'); 
Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36, 39, 117 N.E. 12 (1917); 
State v. Vancak, 90 Ohio St. 211,214, 107 N.E. 511 (1914) 
(''The accused was required to establish this plea of self de-
fense by a preponderance of the evidence."). 
~n 197 4 the legislature enacted R.C. Section 2901.05(A), 
wh1ch stated: 
Every person accused of an offense is presumed in-
nocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the burden of proof is on the prosecution. The 
burden of going forward with the evidence of an affir-
mative defense ... is upon the accused. 
~he second sentence, governing affirmative defenses, men-
tioned only the burden of production; it was silent on the 
burden of persuasion. In State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 
103, 113, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976), the Supreme Court held 
t~at t~e defendant did not bear the burden of proving an af-
firmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
. Since the defendant did not have the burden of persua-
Sion on self-defense, it would seem to follow that the burden 
therefore must fall on the prosecution. That, however, was 
not the case. In State v. Abner, 55 Ohio St.2d 251, 253, 379 
N.E.2d 228 (1978), the Court stated: ''The holding in Robin-
son does not mandate instruction that the prosecution must 
carry the burden of proving an absence of self-defense:' 
In sum, neither party had the burden of persuasion, a 
rather troublesome result should the jury find the evidence 
evenly balanced. In response, the General Assembly 
ame~ded the statute to assign explicitly the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant. Effective November 1, 1978, the 
statute reads: 
Every person accused of an offense is presumed in-
nocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense 
is_ on the prosecution. The burden of going forward 
w1th the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the 
burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence 
for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused. ' 
. Subsequent cases have held that the burden of persua-
Sion for an affirmative defense is on the defendant and that 
the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 
State v. Martin, 21 OhioSt.3d 91, 94,488 N.E.2d 166 (1986) 
("[T]he state may constitutionally require a defendant to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative 
defense of self-defense:'), aff'd, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); State v. 
~~ckson, 22 O~io St.3d 281, 283, 490 N.E.2d 893 (1986) 
( Due process IS not offended by placing the burden of going 
forward with the affirmative defense of self-defense on the 
accused pursuant to R.C. 2901.05:'), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 
917 (1987); State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio App.3d 64, 68,593 
N.E.2d 35 (1990) ("In Ohio, self-defense is an affirmative de-
fense which the defendant has the burden of proving."). 
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"If the defendant fails to prove any one of [the] elements 
by a preponderance ofthe evidence he has failed to demor 
strate that he acted in self-defense." State v. Jackson, 22 
Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 490 N.E.2d 893 (1986), cert. denied 
480 U.S. 917 (1987). ' 
Constitutionality 
In Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987), the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio statute thatal 
locates to the defendant the burden of persuasion on self-
defense. Martin challenged the statute on due process 
grounds. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. 111 re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), held that the Due 
Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof ?eyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 
However, in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), 
the _Court ruled that Winship was not violated by a law that 
ass1gned to the defendant the burden of proving "extreme 
emotional di.sturbance:· which reduced murder to 
manslaughter. According to the Court, Patterson controlled 
An affirmative def~nse, whether self-defense or insanity, 
was not an essential element of the charged crime and, 
thus, the burden of persuasion could be allocated to the de· 
fendant. It did not matter that only Ohio and a few other 
states had chosen to allocate this burden to the defendant. 
INCONSISTENT DEFENSES 
In State v. Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281, 286-87, 142 N.E 
141 (1924), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the defense 
of accident is inconsistent with self-defense. The Court rea 
soned: · 
Self-defense presumes intentional, willful use of force 
to repel force or escape force. Accidental force or 
shooting is exactly the contrary, wholly unintentional 
and unwillful. . . . If the evidence warrants, the defen-
dant has a right to one request or the other. By no man-
ner of logic, law, or legerdemain is he entitled to both. 
Accord Twiman v. State, 13 Ohio Law Abs 459 (App 1933). 
Nevertheless, it is possible that both defenses could 
come into play. In State v. Armbrust, 35 Ohio Law Abs 554, 
558, 42 N.E.2d 214 (App. 1941 ), the accused claimed that 
his "possession and drawing of a weapon may be in self-de 
tense, but the actual infliction of the mortal wound may be 
an accident." The Armbrust court noted that although the 
_Cha"!pion ~aiding "is very broad in its terms and apparent!) 
IS all-mc!us1ve of any conditions:· the case was distinguish-
able on 1ts facts. Thus, there is some support for instructing 
on both ~elf-defense and accident, given the appropriate 
factual Circumstances. Accord State v. Lovejoy, 48 Misc. 20 
357 N.E.2d 424 (Muni. 1976) . 
. In a~other case, the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that 
mcons1stent defenses are permissible: "When the defen-
dant entered his plea of not guilty, he could avail himself of 
all the defenses which the evidence disclosed. It would be 
perfectly proper for him to say (a) I did not fire the shot; (b) 
Whatever I did, I did in my own defense." Graham v. State, 
98 Ohio St. 77,81-82, 120 N.E. 232 (1918). 
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